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Permanent Confiscation of Prison
Contraband: The Fifth Amendment
Behind Bars
Courts have generally failed to recognize that a prisoner has a property
interest in prison contraband.' Prison officials thus may permanently con-
fiscate prison contraband in addition to subjecting the offending prisoner
to traditional means of discipline, such as loss of privileges or good-time
credits. Confiscation may occur regardless of the item's value, whether its
possession is legal outside of the prison context, or whether the legislature
has authorized confiscation.
This Note argues that although prisoners do not retain possessory
rights in prison contraband, they do retain ownership rights, and. thus a
property interest, in items that were legally possessed before being smug-
gled into prison. Most courts to date have neglected to address this issue
squarely and have instead simply dismissed these cases without consider-
ing the merits. The few courts that have examined whether a property
interest exists have erred in their analyses. This Note argues that a prop-
erty interest does exist in many forms of prison contraband, and thus that
the contraband may not be permanently confiscated absent clear statutory
authority. Furthermore, whenever a confiscation is made, be it temporary
or permanent,2 prison officials must provide some procedural protections.
The Note delineates the factors courts should consider in reviewing the
adequacy of such protections.'
1. This Note defines prison contraband as items that have been smuggled into prison contrary to
prison regulations. It includes both items illegal to possess in any context (e.g., marijuana) and those
illegal to possess only in prison (e.g., currency, jewelry, hard-cover books).
2. In a temporary confiscation, prison officials eventually either return the property to the pris-
oner upon his release or send it to a non-prisoner designated by the prisoner. In a permanent confisca-
tion, the state never returns the property.
3. The Note is concerned only with property confiscated pursuant to a prison regulation. For a
case treating loss of a prisoner's property through prison officials' negligence or recklessness, see Par-
ratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (hobby materials received in mail lost through prison officials'
negligence). For cases discussing legitimately held property allegedly taken out of malice or thievery,
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I. THE COURTS' FAILURE To REACH DUE PROCESS QUESTIONS IN
PRISON CONTRABAND CASES
Historically, courts have simply dismissed prisoners' claims regarding
property confiscations. The courts operated under two now-discredited as-
sumptions: (i) that property claims could not be brought under section
1983;" and (ii) that courts should accord extreme deference to prison
officials.5
In 1972, the Supreme Court firmly rejected the first rationale for dis-
missing confiscation cases in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,6 which
explicitly stated that property claims could be brought under section
1983.7
The doctrine of extreme judicial deference toward prison administra-
tors, known as the "hands-off" doctrine,8 has also been eroded in recent
see Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1980) (guard allegedly took prisoner's radio and de-
stroyed it for no legitimate reason); Russell v. Bodner, 489 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1973) (guard took seven
packages of prisoner's legitimately held cigarettes to "prove" prisoner had no remedy). See generally
Note, Prisoner Property Deprivations: Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, 52 IND. L.J.
257 (1976) (focusing on when deprivations due to prison officials' negligence, thievery, or malice
should be actionable under § 1983).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), together with its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)
(1976), provides a cause of action for "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws" by any person acting "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory. . . ." Examples of prison cases ruling that § 1983 did
not apply to property claims include Rhodes v. Sigler, 448 F.2d 1237 (8th Cir. 1971) (dispute over
$2.46); Howard v. Higgins, 379 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1967) (personal property valued at $500 not
returned on inmate's release).
5. See, e.g., Howard v. Swenson, 426 F.2d 277, 277 (8th Cir.) (shoes taken; courts should "inter-
fere" only in "extreme" cases), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 948 (1970); United States ex rel. Wagner v.
Ragen, 213 F.2d 294, 295 (7th Cir.) (prisoner's oil paintings confiscated; courts' function not to
superintend treatment and discipline of prisoners, but only to deliver from imprisonment those ille-
gally confined), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 846 (1954).
6. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
7. "This Court has never adopted the distinction between personal liberties and proprietary rights
as a guide to the contours of § 1343(3) jurisdiction. Today we expressly reject that distinction." Id. at
542. "That rights in property are basic civil rights has long been recognized." Id. at 552. Although
Lynch was not a prison property case, such cases have followed its holding and heard claims brought
under § 1983. See, e.g., Jenson v. Klecker, 648 F.2d 1179, 1183 (8th Cir. 1981); Kimbrough v.
O'Neil, 545 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1976). Courts have allowed § 1983 actions even when the property
at stake is of little value. See, e.g., Weddle v. Director Patuxent Inst., 405 U.S. 1036 (1972) ($3.52
worth of personal property); Russell v. Bodner, 489 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1973) (seven packages of
cigarettes). Commentators are divided as to whether courts should do so. Compare McCormack, The
Expansion of Federal Question Jurisdiction and the Prisoner Complaint Caseload, 1975 Wis. L.
REv. 523, 549-50 (courts should allow such actions) with Note, supra note 3, at 260-62 (courts
should generally rely on state remedies).
In Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), the Supreme Court dismissed a § 1983 action involving
property lost through prison officials' negligence, reasoning that because a state remedy remained
open to the prisoner there was no violation of the due process clause. Id. at 543. The Court was
careful to note, however, that its holding extended only to where "the deprivation did not occur as a
result of some established state procedure." Id. Thus, Parratt's holding would not extend to cases
involving confiscation pursuant to an established state procedure. See also Fiallo v. de Batista, 666
F.2d 729, 733 (1st Cir. 1981) (noting in dictum that Parratt does not extend to cases involving
property lost pursuant to an established state procedure).
8. See generally J. GOBERT & N. COHEN, RIGHIS OF PRISONERS 7-8 (1981) (hands-off doctrine
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years, as the Supreme Court has recognized that "convicted prisoners do
not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and
confinement in prison."' Where the retention of a constitutional right is
consistent with a person's incarceration, that right is retained. 0 Included
among those rights that might be retained are property rights."
The increasing recognition of prisoners' constitutional rights made
courts less hesitant to intervene in the internal affairs of prisons to protect
those rights. 2 The countervailing administrative reasons supporting the
hands-off doctrine came to be seen as insufficient justification for such
complete deference, and the Supreme Court put the doctrine to rest in
1974.13
stemmed from judicial concerns about separation of powers, federalism, and lack of judicial expertise
in internal operations of prisons); Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial
Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963) (analyzing "hands-off"
doctrine).
9. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979) (dictum); see Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980)
(involuntary transfer of prisoner to mental hospital implicated protected liberty interest); Jones v.
North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977) (dictum that prisoners are entitled
to rights under First Amendment); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974) (protected liberty
interest recognized in prisoner's good-time credits; "a prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional
protections when he is imprisoned for crime"); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419-22 (1974)
(ban on attorney-client interviews conducted by paralegals or law students employed by attorneys
violated prisoners' right of access to courts under Fourteenth Amendment). See generally J. GOBERT
& N. COHEN, supra note 8, at 8-9 (noting rejection of hands-off doctrine and expansion of recognized
rights in past twenty years).
10. See Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944) ("A prisoner retains all -the rights
of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law.");
see also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 422-23 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting
Coffin for same point); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 189 (2d Cir. 1971) (same). Additional
support for this can be found in Proposed Standard 1.1 of the American Bar Association's Joint
Committee on the Legal Status of Prisoners, as amended Feb. 9, 1981, which provides that "prisoners
retain all rights of free citizens except where restrictions are necessary to assure orderly confinement
and interaction, to provide reasonable protection for the rights and physical safety of the public and
all members of the prison system, or as otherwise provided by the [ABA] Standards." J. GOBERT &
N. COHEN, supra note 8, at 1-2 (Supp. June 1983) (discussing Proposed Standard).
11. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 529 n.1, 540 (1981) (prisoner enjoys a protected property
interest in hobby materials sent to him by mail but lost through negligence of prison officials); Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) ("Prisoners may ... not be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.").
12. See, e.g., Soloway v. Weger, 389 F. Supp. 409, 410-11 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (prisoner's right to
apply for parole was protected liberty interest); National Prisoners Reform Ass'n v. Sharkey, 347 F.
Supp. 1234, 1237 (D.R.I. 1972) (temporarily enjoining prison officials from interfering with prisoner
associatior's meetings protected by First Amendment). See generally SoUTH CAROLINA DEP'T OF
CORRECTIONS, THE EMERGING RIGHTS OF THE CONFINED at i (1972) ("The judicial system is
beginning to recognize many basic rights of [prisoners] ...rights which virtually everyone took for
granted as having been forfeited by one who was incarcerated . . .).
13. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974) ("[A] policy of judicial restraint cannot
encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising in a federal or
state institution. When a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee,
federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights."). The doctrine could hold up
only as long as prisoners had few protected rights; before the decline of the doctrine, judges did not
need to reach the question of what rights survived incarceration. J. GOBERT & N. COHEN, supra note
8, at 8. The combined forces of an increasingly militant and assertive prison population, an emerging
civil rights/civil liberties bar and the Warren Court's responsiveness to the plight of society's under-
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Perhaps because these developments are relatively recent, however,
courts have still not developed a coherent method of analysis to apply in
prison contraband cases. Indeed, the deference shown by some courts in
prison contraband cases is so extreme as to be the equivalent of the hands-
off doctrine.14 In most cases, courts extend their review only to determine
whether the prisoner received adequate notice that the items in question
were prohibited 5 or whether adequate procedures were used to determine
whether the confiscated items were indeed contraband. Courts have not
even attempted to address whether a property interest exists in prison con-
traband or, if so, what due process requires before such an interest is
terminated. In light of the recent willingness of most courts to intervene
when constitutional interests are implicated, the continued failure in
prison contraband cases to reach these questions suggests an implicit rul-
ing that no property interest exists in prison contraband, or that, even if a
property interest does exist, there is sufficient authority for its forfeiture.
The following sections argue that both of these rulings are in error.
II. THE PROPERTY INTEREST IN PRISON CONTRABAND
To determine whether a person's right to due process under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments has been violated in a property case requires
a two-part test. First, the court must determine whether a property inter-
est exists. 7 Second, if such an interest does exist, the court must decide
whether the requirements of due process were observed before the person
was deprived of the protected interest. 8 Thus, before a prisoner may raise
a constitutional claim concerning the denial or destruction of property, he
must show that he holds some interest in that property. To establish a
privileged set in motion the judiciary's eventual rejection of the excessive deference of the hands-off
doctrine. Id. at 1-9. See generally Haas, Judicial Politics and Correctional Refonn: An Analysis of
the Decline of the "Hands-off' Doctrine, 1977 DET. C.L. REv. 795 (arguing that basis for hands-off
doctrine no longer exists and that judiciary has thus become effective forum for redressing prisoners'
grievances).
14. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Ford, 609 F.2d 197, 198 (5th Cir.) (upholding confiscation of $2,197.40
and stating that "Ojludicial interference with prison administration should be avoided whenever possi-
ble"), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 969 (1980); Butler v. Bensinger, 377 F. Supp. 870, 875 (N.D. I11. 1974)
(confiscation of prisoner's property falls within rubric that federal court will "interfere" with matters
involving the internal management of state prison only in "exceptional" circumstances); Cardwell v.
Hogan, 23 Ariz. App. 475, 476, 534 P.2d 283, 284 (1975) (confiscation of $340 upheld on grounds
that "[w]ide discretion is vested in correctional authorities").
15. See Pepperling v. Crist, 678 F.2d 787, 789 (9th Cir. 1982) (upholding confiscation in absence
of statutory authority, reasoning that "in most cases complained of, prisoners were in possession of
contraband, items they knew were subject to confiscation").
16. See Sherman v. MacDougall, 656 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1981); Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d
118, 131-32 & n.29 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub non. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979).
17. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).
18. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1970).
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property interest, one looks not to the Constitution but to "existing rules
or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law
"19
Courts have failed to find a property interest in any prison contraband
because they have failed to look to the proper "independent source of
law." Courts have confused prison contraband with conventional contra-
band and looked for a property interest in prison contraband as such.
Courts should instead begin their analyses earlier, looking not to an inter-
est in the item as prison contraband, but to the interest held in the item
before it became contraband by being brought into prison (e.g., the interest
held in money earned in the course of one's employment and legally pos-
sessed outside of prison).
A. "Internal" and "External" Prison Contraband
Prison contraband may consist either of items illegal to possess only if
the possessor is a prisoner, "internal" prison contraband, or of items ille-
gal for anyone to possess, "external" prison contraband.
External prison contraband may be either "contraband per se" or "de-
rivative contraband". Contraband per se, such as marijuana or a sawed-
off shotgun, is illegal to possess regardless of the context in which it is
held. Thus, no property interest can ever exist in it.2° In contrast, deriva-
tive contraband, such as an automobile used to transport illegal narcotics,
is illegal only because it has been used as part of an illegal course of
action.21 The initial property interest in derivative contraband is not lost
until the item is used in violation of a statute calling for its forfeiture;22
without such a statute, the property interest is retained and the item is not
forfeited even though it may have been used in violation of the law.23
Whether per se or derivative contraband, however, external contraband
19. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; see also Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 529 n.1 (1981) (quoting Roth
and noting absence of contention that no property interest existed in prisoner's package negligently
lost by prison officials).
20. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 53 (1951) ("'[N]o property rights shall exist' in
contraband goods . . ... ) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 3116) (now at 26 U.S.C. § 7302 (1976)); State v.
McNichols, 63 Idaho 100, 104, 117 P.2d 468, 470 (1941) ("slot machines. . . are not property but
contraband subject to seizure and summary destruction") (citations omitted).
21. See, e.g., One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965) (involving
automobile used to transport illegally manufactured alcohol and distinguishing case fromJeffers and
others involving contraband per se because latter may be forfeited even pursuant to an illegal search);
United States v. $2500 in United States Currency, 689 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1982) (forfeiture of money
gained through sale of heroin).
22. See, e.g., United States v. One Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 436 F. Supp. 1292, 1298 n.7 (S.D.
Ga. 1977) (sovereign's title to aircraft used to transport marijuana vests immediately upon forbidden
use); Farley v. $168,400.97, 55 N.J. 31, 40, 259 A.2d 201, 206 (1969) (sovereign's title to money used
in violation of gambling statutes vests immediately upon forbidden use). Even here, however, the
plaintiff retains enough of a property interest to deserve procedural protections, see infra p. 915.
23. See infra p. 912.
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can never be the subject of any kind of property interest even before its
possessor enters prison.
While many items of prison contraband (e.g., marijuana) are external
contraband and thus not the subject of a property interest even before a
prisoner illegally brings them into prison, internal prison contraband (e.g.,
money, jewelry, prohibited literature) is legally possessed before it is
brought into prison, and is thus the subject of a property interest.24 This
pre-existing property interest in internal prison contraband is constitu-
tionally protected. And just as forfeiture of a free person's interest in de-
rivative contraband requires clear statutory authority,25 forfeiture of a
prisoner's property interest in internal prison contraband should also re-
quire such authority. Before a more specific discussion of the implications
of this assertion, however, the Note analyzes the inconsistencies of the cur-
rent treatment of prison contraband.
24. This certainly holds true where the possessor was the legal owner of the interest outside of the
prison (as, for instance, where the property came into his possession as consideration for labor or
property traded in return, or by gift or bequest). But even where the plaintiff was not the legal owner
outside of the prison, but was merely in possession of the goods (for example, if he found the prop-
erty), he would still have a property interest in the goods, valid as against any claimant (including the
state) except the true owner. See, e.g., Cesarini v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 3, 7 (N.D. Ohio 1969),
aff'd, 428 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1970). See generally R. BOYER, SURVEY OF PROPERTY 679-80 (3d ed.
1981) ("Possession is a basic property interest entitling the possessor to certain rights . . . ."). Even
where the prisoner from whom the confiscation occurred did not have an interest in the item before it
entered the prison, but instead came into possession when a visitor or another prisoner transferred it
to him, he still would hold a property interest. See infra note 59.
Of course, this would not be true if the item were external contraband (e.g., narcotics or money
gained through the illegal sale of narcotics) when there was a statute calling for its forfeiture. See
United States v. $2500 in United States Currency, 689 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1982). In such a case, the
possessor would not have had a property interest even before bringing the item into prison.
The fact that possession of internal prison contraband was legal outside of the prison not only
means that a property interest existed in such contraband, but also that returning it to the prisoner
upon his release or sending it to persons he designates outside of prison would not result in criminal
possession. In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965), the Court drew this
distinction regarding the return of confiscated contraband in the non-prison context. There state offi-
dais, as authorized by statute, confiscated illegally manufactured liquor and the vehicle used to trans-
port the liquor. Remanding the case for a determination of whether the search was illegal, the Court
noted that a finding of illegality would require the return of the automobile but not of the liquor, as
the latter was contraband per se rather than merely derivative contraband, and its return would sub-
ject plaintiff to possible criminal penalties for possession. Id. at 699.
25. While most courts have failed to discern this distinction between contraband per se and deriv-
ative contraband with regard to prison contraband, see, e.g., Lowery v. Cuyler, 521 F. Supp. 430
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (discussed infra p. 907), one court has explicitly noted the distinction, see Balckom v.
Heptinstall, 152 Ga. App. 539, 263 S.E.2d 275 (1979), cert. dismissed, 245 Ga. 567, 267 S.E.2d 623
(1980) (disallowing permanent confiscation of $2000 because money was not inherently unlawful, i.e.,
malum in se, but became unlawful only under certain specific circumstances, and no statutory author-
ity existed for confiscation). Although the court did not explicitly state that the existence of a property
interest turned on this distinction, such a finding is implicit in its holding.
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B. Courts' Treatment of the Property Interest in Prison Contraband
Most courts appear unaware of their failure even to discuss whether a
previously protected interest was affected by the confiscation at issue.
Without examining whether the property at issue is external or internal
prison contraband, courts dismiss a case after establishing only that the
items at issue are "contraband,"2 or require merely that prison officials
provide procedural protections to determine whether the items might have
been legitimately held.2 7 Such opinions violate the spirit, if not the letter,
of the cases concerning the constitutional protection of property interests.28
Only two cases have directly addressed the question of whether a prop-
erty interest exists in prison contraband. Sell v. Parratt29 explicitly held
that a property interest exists3" and discussed the consequences of its rul-
ing. Lowery v. Cuyler31 is the only case that explicitly sets forth its rea-
sons for not finding a property interest in prison contraband.
Sell v. Parratt disallowed the permanent confiscation of about five hun-
dred dollars held as prison contraband3 2 and explicitly recognized a prop-
erty interest in it. Citing Board of Regents v. Roth,33 the court looked to
state common law and found the source for a property interest in prison
26. See, e.g., Pcpperling v. Crist, 678 F.2d 787, 789 (9th Cir. 1982) (prisoners' claims that prop-
erty is often damaged or stolen during searches dismissed on basis that most claims concerned contra-
band); Sullivan v. Ford, 609 F.2d 197, 198 (5th Cir.) (upholding confiscation of over $2000 on basis
that it was contraband, and that regulation under which it was confiscated was "reasonable"), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 969 (1980).
27. See Sherman v. MacDougall, 656 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1981) (court looked only to
whether adequate procedural protections were provided for confiscation of prisoner's prohibited
magazines); United States ex rel. Wolfish v. United States, 428 F. Supp. 333, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(requiring procedural protections to determine whether items taken were contraband and thus within
regulations calling for their destruction, but not questioning officials' authority to destroy or otherwise
permanently to confiscate items subject to the regulations), aff'd sub norn. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d
118 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nor. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
28. See infra pp. 912-16
29. Sell v. Wolff, No. CV74-L-63 (D. Neb. Feb. 4, 1976), aff'd sub nora. Sell v. Parratt, 548
F.2d 753 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 873 (1977). The unreported district court opinion will
often be cited in this Note in describing the reasoning behind the Eighth Circuit's holding because the
Eighth Circuit simply accepted the district court's conclusion that Nebraska's common law gave pris-
oners a possessory interest in prison contraband without giving any detailed discussion or analysis of
its finding that a property interest exists.
30. See also Hanvey v. Blankenship, 474 F. Supp. 1349 (W.D. Va. 1979) (implicitly recognizing
property interest in $750 but also finding clear statutory authority to confiscate), aff'd, 631 F.2d 296
(4th Cir. 1980); Balckom v. Heptinstall, 152 Ga. App. 539, 263 S.E.2d 275 (1979), cert. dismissed,
245 Ga. 567, 267 S.E.2d 623 (1980) (implicitly recognizing prisoner's property interest in $2000)
(discussed supra note 25).
31. 521 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
32. It is not clear from the Sell opinions, nor from most of the confiscation opinions discussed in
this Note, how the inmate came to possess this property. Unless otherwise stated, the Note assumes
that the contraband was legally possessed before it was smuggled into prison. Of course, if it were not
legally possessed no property interest would exist in it as prison contraband, since none would have
existed in it even before it was brought into prison. See supra note 24.
33. 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (discussed infra p. 912).
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contraband-4 in the doctrine that the mere possession of items gives rise to
a property interest, valid "against all except the person who can prove a
superior interest.""5 The result, the Sell court reasoned, was that the in-
mate's interest could not be taken away without clear statutory author-
ity."6 Unable to find such authority, the court held for the prisoner.
3 7
Sell's analysis of the source and existence of a property interest in
prison contraband, although correct in looking to state common law for
the property interest and in concluding that a property interest exists, is in
part flawed. Sell looked for a property interest in the items at issue as
prison contraband. But the sources of state law which Sell cited were
neither statutes nor prison cases.38 Sell's language implies that because
non-prisoners have a common law property interest in any property they
possess, prisoners likewise have a common law interest in any prison con-
traband they possess.
This assertion is both novel and, by itself, insufficient. Never before had
the courts in the Eighth or any other circuit recognized any kind of inter-
est held by the possessor of prison contraband,"9 and it is doubtful that the
non-prison common law cases were meant to extend to prison cases. This
is particularly true in light of the fact that they were decided during peri-
ods when prisoners' constitutional rights received little judicial solici-
tude.40 Moreover, Sell failed to deal with the position, advanced in opin-
ions both before and after Sell, that permanent confiscation is necessary to
deter prisoners from bringing contraband into prison.41 Finally, the
Eighth Circuit's decision did not provide the reasoning behind the finding
of a property interest, but merely agreed with the district court's unre-
34. See Sell, 548 F.2d at 756-57.
35. No. CV74-L-63, slip op. at 2.
36. 548 F.2d at 758.
37. Id. at 758-59.
38. No. CV74-L-63, slip op. at 2-3. The district court cited Fitzsimons v. Frey, 153 Neb. 550, 45
N.W.2d 603 (1951) (conversion of personalty and damages to real property), No. CV74-L-63 at 2,
and Barkley v. Leiter, 49 Neb. 123, 68 N.W. 381 (1896) (sheriff's seizure of goods, apparently for
repayment of tax), No. CV74-L-63 at 2. It also cited 36A C.J.S. Finding Lost Goods § 5, at 421
(1961) ("By the general rule of common law one who finds and appropriates a lost chattel ...
acquires the title thereto and the right to possession thereof against all the world except the true
owner."), reasoning that this rule probably obtains in Nebraska, No. CV74-L-63 at 3.
39. Whereas this Note argues that Sell is correct in saying prisoners hold a property interest in
contraband they possess, this is not because, as Sell's holding implies, the common law had recognized
an interest in prison contraband as such. The courts had never done so. See supra p. 899. The interest
stems rather from the ownership interest held in the item before it is brought into prison, see infra pp.
909-11.
40. Barkley was written in 1896 and Fitzsimmons in 1951, see supra note 38, while prisoners'
constitutional rights were largely ignored until about twenty years ago, see J. GOaa.RT & N. COHEN,
supra note 8, at 1.
41. See Lowery v. Cuyler, 521 F. Supp. 430, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Cardwell v. Hogan, 23 Ariz.
App. 475, 476-77, 534 P.2d 283, 284-85 (1975).
Vol. 93: 901, 1984
Prison Contraband
ported reasoning on this matter.42 These flaws have left the case in rela-
tive isolation: It has been followed in only one other circuit,4 and remains
either explicitly or implicitly rejected"" in all others."'
Lowery v. Cuyler"I is the only other prison contraband case that has
attempted to address the due process questions. Like Sell, Lowery involved
the permanent confiscation of a large sum of money; like Sell, it cited
Roth for the proposition that a court must determine whether state law
recognizes a property interest in the confiscated goods.47 The Lowery court
noted that Sell had found a property interest in Nebraska law,4 but did
not analyze Sell's reasoning49 or determine whether the relevant Penn-
sylvania laws were similar to those of Nebraska. Instead, the Lowery court
simply reasoned that because "a state prison system may define the prop-
erty in which an incarcerated inmate may gain an interest," 50 no property
interest exists where a state prohibits prisoners from possessing certain
items.51
Both Sell And Lowery have erred in their analyses by blurring the dis-
tinctions between "new property," which was at issue in Roth, and "old
property," which is at issue in prison contraband cases.
42. 548 F.2d at 757; see supra note 29.
43. The only circuit to cite Sell as authority is the Fourth, in Hanvey v. Blackenship, 631 F.2d
296 (4th Cir. 1980) (upholding permanent confiscation of $750 pursuant to specific statutory author-
ity). Hanvey, however, omitted the first step in Sell's reasoning-looking to state law to find a prop-
erty interest-and instead implicitly assumed that one existed, 631 F.2d at 296.
44. See, e.g., Pepperling v. Crist, 678 F.2d 787, 789 (9th Cir. 1982) (implicit); Sullivan v. Ford,
609 F.2d 197, 198 (5th Cir.) (implicit), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 969 (1980); Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d
118, 131-32 & n.29 (2d Cir. 1978) (implicit), rev'd on other grounds sub nor. Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520 (1979); Lowery v. Cuyler, 521 F. Supp. 430, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (explicit).
45. While it may seem inconsistent to fault Sell for not addressing these arguments but then to
reject the arguments as invalid, see infra pp. 912-13, this is necessary because the arguments at first
glance appear valid, and only by refuting them will the Sell holding come to exert persuasive author-
ity in other jurisdictions. The few cases citing Sell do so only to address the question of what is
required to confiscate contraband once a property interest has been found. See, e.g., Hanvey v. Blank-
enship, 474 F. Supp. 1349, 1350 (W.D. Va. 1979), aff'd, 631 F.2d 296 (4th Cir. 1980); Brager v.
Fenton, No. 79-632 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 1979).
46. 521 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
47. Id. at 432 n.8. The sum at issue was $1045. Id. at 430.
48. Id. at 431.
49. It is unlikely that the court was even aware of how Sell found a property interest, since the
Eighth Circuit's opinion omitted this information. See supra note 29.
50. 521 F. Supp. at 432 (emphasis added).
51. Because the Lowery court saw no property interest at issue, it did not reach the remaining due
process questions of whether statutory authority or procedural protections are required for a forfei-
ture. Lowery rejected Sell on the belief that Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979), which requires
that "wide-ranging deference" be shown in the area of prison discipline, had superseded Sell. Lowery,
521 F. Supp. at 434. It is doubtful, however, that the Court in Bell meant to extend this deference so
far as to allow a confiscation of contraband in the absence of any due process protection, as Lowery
asserts. See infra note 60. This is particularly true in light of Bell's leaving intact, by failing to
address, the Second Circuit's holding below that procedural protections must accompany any seizure
of contraband. See 573 F.2d at 131-32 & n.29; see also Steinberg v. Taylor, 500 F. Supp. 477, 479
(D. Conn. 1980) (following Second Circuit's mandate for procedural protections and noting that Su-
preme Court's reversal in Bell based on other grounds).
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Roth, relied upon in both Sell and Lowery, dealt with "new prop-
erty. '" 52 New property is property that originally stems from the state and
that the state issues to certain individuals or groups.53 If a plaintiff can
show that the state recognizes the class of persons of which the plaintiff is
a member to be entitled to the new property at issue, the resulting prop-
erty interest may not be denied without due process. 5' In Roth, for exam-
ple, the plaintiff, a non-tenured university professor, could show no source
of an interest beyond a unilateral expectation in what was in effect a fu-
ture employment contract. 55 He was not entitled to due process before
being denied the contract. At no time did he have any right or interest in
that future contract, or property; thus, nothing was being taken away
from him.5"
In the case of internal prison contraband, however, the situation is
quite different. The prisoner's possession of these items was legitimate
before he brought them into prison. The prisoner therefore had a constitu-
tionally protected interest in the items recognized by state common law,
5
7
and a constitutional right to due process before the prison officials took
that property interest from him through confiscation.58
Both Lowery and Sell ask whether the state has recognized an interest
in prison contraband as prison contraband. In confusing prison contra-
band with new property, the Sell and Lowery courts erred in where they
looked for the origin of the property interest. With an item of new prop-
erty, the interest always stems directly from the state, and thus where the
state has not recognized an interest in the class of persons claiming to be
entitled to it, no interest exists. The property interest in internal prison
contraband, however, does not come directly from the state but derives
from the state's common law recognition of the interest that the possessor
52. See generally Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (coining phrase).
53. Examples include welfare benefits, services, contracts, franchises, and licenses. Id. at 733. Old
property, in contrast, would include traditional forms of wealth, of which the government is not the
source but which are recognized by state common law.
54. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 576-78 (university professor entitled to no due process protections
before "loss" of state employment contract because unable to show entitlement to contract); cf. Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) (prisoner entitled to due process before loss of state-
created good-time credits in which he had been given a liberty interest).
55. Roth had been hired for a fixed term of one academic year to teach at a state university.
When the university, without explanation and without offering any opportunity to challenge its deci-
sion, did not renew his contract at the end of the year, Roth sued, claiming, inter alia, loss of property
interest without due process. Roth, 408 U.S. at 566-69.
56. Whether the plaintiff in Roth in fact had more than a unilateral expectation (such as some
sort of implied agreement or guarantee) may be disputed, but that is a question of fact. What is
important for purposes of this Note is Roth's conclusion that where someone has never gained an
interest, no due process questions are raised when he is "deprived" of it, since nothing is being taken
away from him.
57. See supra p. 906.
58. See supra note 11.
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had prior to bringing internal prison contraband into prison.59 The issue
is not whether an interest is gained in prison contraband as such, but
whether the interest held prior to the item's entrance into prison is
retained.
Lowery also fails to recognize that a prisoner does not lose all of his
constitutional rights because of his conviction and incarceration, but only
those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken away from him by
law."0 Although a prisoner may therefore lose his possessory rights in in-
ternal prison contraband, he does not lose his ownership rights,"1 unless
they are expressly taken from him by statute, because ownership rights
are not inconsistent with the needs and objectives of the prison. It is these
rights to which due process protections must attach in prison contraband
cases, and thus it is necessary to consider what due process requires before
such rights may be taken.
59. The internal prison contraband may have come indirectly from the state, as with money that
originally came from a welfare check. But when there is an intermediate step-legal possession
outside of prison-a property interest vests in the possessor. See supra note 24. It is this interest to
which due process protections attach.
This protection attaches even where inmate A is found in possession of property that he did not
bring into prison himself but instead received from inmate B, who did bring it in. Where B retains the
interest, A may gain that interest-by trading for it or being given it-even under illegal circum-
stances without the threat of forfeiture to the state, so long as no express statute authorizes forfeiture.
An analogous situation exists outside of prison where money is transferred in violation of gambling
statutes. Money won in these circumstances and held in the gambler's exclusive possession is not
subject to forfeiture without clear statutory authority, because the possessor is deemed to hold a prop-
erty interest in such property. See State v. Verrilli, 132 Conn. 46, 47-48, 42 A.2d 338, 339 (1945);
Chappell v. Stapleton, 58 Ga. App. 138, 139, 198 S.E. 109, 110 (1938).
60. See supra note 10. Lowery's confusion is evident from the opinion's own words:
[T]he question is whether a state prison system may define the property in which an incarcer-
ated inmate may gain an interest after his incarceration. If it can, and if an inmate is not
permitted to acquire certain items, he can have no property interest in such items, and they
would therefore not be protectible [sic] within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
"forfeiture" question would be irrelevant, for there would be no protectible [sic] property in-
terest in the "forfeited" items.
Lowery, 521 F. Supp. at 432. Lowery thus looks not to whether an inmate has lost his ownership right
in the property involved, but whether, once in prison, he gains it.
61. Property interests, of course, are made up of many interests, and these interests need not all be
held by the same person. For example, while an infant whose estate is being held in trust might have
an ownership interest in that estate, he does not have a possessory interest in it. In the same fashion, a
prisoner might have an ownership but not a possessory interest in internal prison contraband. An
analogy can be found in Hillman v. Stults, 263 Cal. App. 2d 848, 70 Cal. Rptr. 295 (1968), where a
prisoner was allowed to exercise his ownership rights to transfer and convey his real and personal
property, including jewelry, outside the prison. The Hillinan court stated that "[wihile the Adult
Authority has control over the person of the inmate, his outside property does not come within its
supervision or control," because "the Penal Code provides that no conviction results in a forfeiture of
property except when expressly imposed by law." Id. at 873, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 309; see also In re
Harrell, 2 Cal. 3d 675, 702-03, 470 P.2d 640, 658-59, 87 Cal. Rptr. 504, 522-23 (1970) (prisoner's
right to inherit property and to own written material produced during imprisonment may not be
interfered with by prison officials), cert. denied sub norm. Harrell v. California, 401 U.S. 914 (1971);
In re Fein, 51 Misc. 2d 1012, 1014, 274 N.Y.S.2d 547, 550-51, (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1966) (life prisoner
not divested of his ownership rights, but entitled to inherit property and to transfer by will).
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III. DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CONFISCATION OF
PRISON CONTRABAND
Once it has been determined that a property interest exists in prison
contraband, prison officials may deny a prisoner that interest only if they
employ due process. Due process for permanent confiscation of prison
contraband requires both clear statutory authority and adequate procedu-
ral protections.
A. Statutory Authority Is Required
When an item in which one has a property interest is permanently
confiscated, that confiscation constitutes a forfeiture. The government pays
no compensation in forfeiture cases."2
Forfeitures are not favored in the law, and will not be upheld except
pursuant to clear statutory authority; 3 mere legislative acquiescence in
the actions of prison officials is inadequate to justify forfeitures.6 4 Thus,
62. In contrast, in "takings" cases the government must provide just compensation. U.S. CONsT.
amend. V. The property taken has never been used in violation of the law but is merely something
that the government must, by reason of public necessity, appropriate to itself (e.g., land for a high-
way). See J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 1128-29 (1981). A forfeiture, however, is "a
divestiture of property in consequence of a default or an offense." BALLANTINE's LAW DICTIONARY
489 (3d ed. 1969). The illegal use of the property results in forfeiture to the state; thus, no compensa-
tion is required. See King v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 767, 772 (D. Colo. 1968) ("Forfeiture is
quite different from condemnation in that the latter requires the payment of just compensation."); see
also Sell, 548 F.2d at 758 (quoting King for same point).
63. In United States v. Lane Motor Co., 199 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1952), aff'd, 344 U.S. 630
(1953), the defendant regularly used his automobile to transport himself between his home and his
illegal still. Id. at 496. The relevant statute called for the forfeiture of "property intended for use in
violating. . . the internal-revenue laws, or regulations prescribed under such. . . laws." Id. at 497.
In invalidating the forfeiture, the court stated: "[Florfeitures are not favored and should be enforced
only when within both the letter and spirit of the law." Id.; see also United States v. One 1977
Cadillac, 644 F.2d 500, 501 (5th Cir. 1981) ("As a general rule, forfeiture is not favored, and statutes
providing for forfeiture are strictly construed."); City of Anchorage v. Thomas, 624 P.2d 271, 273
(Alaska 1981) ("We are naturally reluctant to impute to the legislature an intent to impose a forfei-
ture unless expressly authorized or absolutely necessary to further a legitimate public interest."). The
specificity of legislative intent required by Thomas parallels that required to deprive a prisoner of
constitutional rights that he would enjoy outside of prison. See supra note 10.
Courts are reluctant to give effect to forfeiture statutes even where equity or "natural justice"
would support forfeiture. See King v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 767, 771 (D. Colo. 1968) (although
government could take actual possession of rifle used to assassinate President Kennedy and although
"natural law" or "natural justice" "demanded" forfeiture, compensation necessary in absence of stat-
ute authorizing forfeiture).
64. Legislative acquiescence should not be construed as an intent to delegate the requisite author-
ity to confiscate prison contraband permanently because it is doubtful that many legislatures have ever
considered the problem. As the Supreme Court stated:
In order to decide whether [legislative] acquiescence should give. . . the same support as an
express statutory . . . command, it is appropriate to review the extent to which the [agency's]
policy has been given consideration by Congress. . .and the nature of the authority specifi-
cally delegated ....
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 105 (1976) (emphasis added); see also Sandalow, Judicial
Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1162, 1188 (1977) (stressing need to assure that govern-
mental institutions, subordinate to Congress, which make decisions about fundamental rights do so
Prison Contraband
courts must ensure that prison confiscations do not occur where legisla-
tures have do not clearly intended to authorize them.6"
Some states have exercised their power to enact express statutes with
regard to permanent confiscation of prison contraband.6" Unfortunately,
however, courts in prison contraband cases often hold general delegations
of authority to prison officials to be sufficient grounds for such confisca-
tion. 7 Although general statutes could be said necessarily to authorize
only when Congress has deliberately so authorized); cf. C. BLACK, STRUcrURE AND RELATIONSHIP
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 88-89 (1969) (noting with disapproval that in "overwhelming majority of
[police investigations] the only extrajudicial determination of the propriety or constitutionality of the
conduct concerned is. . .not Congress, not the legislature, not the governor, not even the city council,
but Chief Doe [the chief of police]").
Actions by the Eighth Circuit and legislatures within that jurisdiction illustrate that legislatures
probably have given little or no consideration to the issue of whether contraband should be subject to
permanent confiscation. Until 1977, the Eighth Circuit invariably dismissed claims regarding confis-
cation of prisoners' property on the ground of deference to wardens' disciplinary authority or because
property claims were believed to state no civil rights action by themselves. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Sigler,
448 F.2d 1237 (8th Cir. 1971) (citing both grounds as reason for dismissal); Howard v. Swenson, 426
F.2d 277 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 948 (1970). It might be argued that the legisla-
tures' acquiescence in these judicial interpretations implied an intent to authorize forfeitures. Since
1977, however, when the Eighth Circuit in Sell overruled its earlier approach and prohibited confis-
cation without express statutory authority, the legislatures have continued to acquiesce. For example,
the Nebraska statutes involved in Sell have not been changed. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 83-173(6),
(11) & 83-185(1), (2) (1981) (annotation noting Sell's interpretation of statute); see also IOWA CODE
ANN. § 218.4 (West 1969) (directors of particular correctional institutions shall recommend rules
"they may deem necessary for the discharge of their duties"); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 241.01-.32
(West 1972) (control and supervision of department of corrections relegated to corrections commis-
sioner); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-47-23 (1976) (same); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 24-2-6 (1979)
(warden may use "[a]ll necessary means. . . to maintain order in the penitentiary. . . ."). But see
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 217.365 (1983) (enacted in 1982, expressly authorizing permanent confiscation of
money held as prison contraband). Such inaction suggests that the issue of permanent confiscation in
the prison context has received little legislative consideration; thus, legislative silence should not be
taken as an intention to delegate such authority.
65. Cf. City of Anchorage v. Thomas, 624 P.2d 271, 273 (Alaska 1981) (proceeds from tax fore-
closure sale of real property may not be forfeited absent clear statutory authority). An analogy may
help illustrate the issue at hand. Suppose that NASA or the Pentagon, without the authorization of
Congress but pursuant to its own administrative regulations, permanently confiscated any cameras
brought into its facilities. Although such agencies may, as a necessary implication of the functions of
their facilities, have sufficient authority to prohibit cameras or to confiscate the film in the cameras,
there is no such inherent need to confiscate permanently the cameras themselves. Such a forfeiture
would require explicit legislative action. See supra note 63. Because prisoners do not lose all of their
rights upon conviction and incarceration, but only those which would be inconsistent with incarcera-
tion, see supra note 10, they retain the same ownership rights in prison contraband as the hypotheti-
cal visitors to NASA or the Pentagon retain in their cameras.
66. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 53-23.1 (1978) ("Any item of personal property, tangible or intangible,
which an inmate in any penal institution is prohibited from possessing. . . shall, when found in the
possession of an inmate, be confiscated and sold or destroyed as the Board, or its designated agent,
may direct."), discussed in Hanvey v. Blankenship, 474 F. Supp. 1349, 1350 (W. D. Va. 1979),
aff'd, 631 F.2d 296 (4th Cir. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 402.18(3) (West 1975) ("Any contraband
found upon, or in the possession of, any patient or inmate in any [state] institution under the jurisdic-
tion of any [state] division shall be confiscated and liquidated and the proceeds thereof shall be depos-
ited in the welfare trust fund of the division."), discussed in Sullivan v. Ford, 609 F.2d 197 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 969 (1980). The Sullivan court noted this provision, 609 F.2d at 197, but
based its holding upon judicial deference to prison officials, id. at 198.
67. In federal prisons, prison officials are authorized "to provide for the protection, instruction,
and discipline" of all inmates. 18 U.S.C. § 4042(3) (1976). This general statute was cited as sufficient
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temporary confiscations in order to provide for the protection, instruction,
and discipline of prisoners,"" no such implication exists to authorize per-
manent confiscations.
First, an ownership interest in contraband is not inconsistent with the
warden's need to maintain discipline and security among convicted prison-
ers.6 9 Once the items are out of the prisoner's actual possession, the dan-
ger they present no longer exists.7 0 The threat of permanent confiscation
is also not a necessary deterrent, because alternative forms of discipline
are available.7 1 Second, permanent confiscation of certain types of prop-
erty (e.g., large sums of money) might hinder prisoners' efforts to reestab-
lish themselves upon their release and thus work against the goal of reha-
bilitation.72 Finally, permanent confiscation raises potential problems of
equity among prisoners: Loss of a given amount of property will have an
unequal impact on prisoners depending on their personal financial status.
Nor is permanent confiscation of prison contraband authorized merely
by reason of a prisoner's conviction. This type of discipline, a taking of his
property, exceeds the limitations placed on a prisoner's constitutional
rights by virtue of his conviction 7  and thus is not within prison officials'
disciplinary discretion. Whereas prison officials may circumscribe certain
authority to confiscate permanently $25 in Brager v. Fenton, No. 79-632, slip op. at 3 (M.D. Pa. Oct.
29, 1979). The Pennsylvania law used in Lowery to uphold the permanent confiscation of $1045 gave
corrections officials authority "to promulgate by-laws, rules and regulations for the management of
[state prisons]." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 306(d) (Purdon 1962), quoted in Lowery, 521 F. Supp. at
432.
68. Even here, however, the warden's discretion is limited in that the prohibition must be a rea-
sonable limitation in light of security or other legitimate concerns of the prison. Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 554 (1979).
69. Consistent with the notion of distinguishing between possessory rights and ownership rights,
see supra note 61, Sell stated:
It is familiar law that possession of property is of two kinds, actual and constructive. Granting
that the prison authorities had the right to deprive the plaintiffs of the immediate actual pos-
session and enjoyment of the funds in question, the exercise of that right did not necessarily
destroy the right of the plaintiffs to have the funds deposited to their accounts on the prison
books or held for ultimate return to them and thus remain in their constructive possession.
548 F.2d at 757.
70. For an example of a court that has simply missed this point, see Sullivan v. Ford, 609 F.2d
197, 198 (5th Cir.) (upholding permanent confiscations in part on basis that actual possession poses
danger to prison security), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 969 (1980).
71. For example, officials might instead deprive a prisoner of privileges or good-time credits, place
him in segregation, or increase his work requirements. These alternatives may be less effective deter-
rents, and prison officials are in a good position to discern this. But because forfeitures are so disfa-
vored in the law, this discretion should not be given to prison administrators unless it is clear that the
legislature has so intended. See supra note 64. For examples of courts upholding permanent confisca-
tion as a necessary deterrent, apparently due to a failure to perceive the availability of alternative
forms of discipline, see Lowery v. Cuyler, 521 F. Supp. 430, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Cardwell v.
Hogan, 23 Ariz. App. 475, 534 P.2d 283, 284-85 (1975).
72. Where the only statutes that can be found are those which authorize temporary confiscation,
officials should be required to send the property to persons outside the prison whom the prisoner has
designated. The inmate has lost only the right actually to possess the property, not to transfer it as he
wishes. See cases cited supra note 61.
73. See supra note 10.
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liberty interests (provided they do not take more liberty than that which
was lost as a result of the conviction),"" they have no discretionary power
over the contraband at issue in these cases, because a prisoner's ownership
interest in the contraband is neither lost, nor subject to loss, as result of
the initial conviction.
B. Procedural Protections Must Be Afforded by Prison Officials
Even where statutory authority exists for permanent confiscation of a
property interest in contraband, prisoners may not be deprived of it unless
prison officials provide at least some procedural protections. 5 Until such
protections are provided, the prisoner retains an interest in the items, 6
and unless the protections are provided within a reasonable time period,
the forfeiture will be declared invalid.
7 7
Courts have yet to analyze carefully the procedural protections re-
quired.7 8 The Lowery court stated that since no property interest existed
in the contraband, confiscation required no procedural protection under
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.79 The Sell court
74. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (involuntary transfer to mental hospital implicated
protected liberty interest); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442
U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (conviction extinguishes one's liberty right to be conditionally released before expira-
tion of valid sentence); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976) (holding that involuntary trans-
fer of Massachusetts state prisoner from medium-security to maximum-security prison did-not affect
any liberty interest, as his conviction had "constitutionally deprived [him] of his liberty to the extent
that the State may confine him and subject him to the rules of its prison system so long as the
conditions of confinement do not otherwise violate the Constitution").
75. Cf Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974) (prisoners' property interest protected
by due process clause).
76. The property interest is said to vest in the government the moment that the property is used
in violation of a statute that calls for its forfeiture. See supra note 22. Pending the completion of an
adequate procedure, however, the government's title is only conditional. The earlier "vesting" appears
to be a judicial fiction used to protect the government against persons to whom a sale or gift is made
after the violation of the statute but before the completion of procedural due process. As stated by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1 (1890):
[T]he forfeiture takes effect immediately upon the commission of the act; the right to the prop-
erty then vests in the United States, although the title is not perfected untiljudicial condemna-
tion; . . . . [Tihe condemnation, when obtained, relates back to. . . the time [of the offense],
and avoids all intermediate sales and alienations, even to purchasers in good faith.
Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Eight Rhodesian Stone Statues, 449 F. Supp.
193, 195 n.l (C.D. Cal. 1978) (conditional right to property vests in government upon forfeiture but
government's title not perfected until decree of judicial condemnation obtained).
77. United States v. One Motor Yacht Named Mercury, 527 F.2d 1112, 1114 (1st Cir. 1975)
(121 month delay in commencing forfeiture proceedings violated due process clause and required
return of the property); United States v. One Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 436 F.Supp. 1292, 1298-99
(S.D. Ga. 1977) (8 month delay violated due process).
78. With the exception of Sell, the courts that have addressed this question have done so only to
require a determination as to whether or not the items in question were contraband; they have not
recognized a property interest in contraband, see supra p. 907.
79. Lowery, 521 F. Supp. at 432. This was only dictum, however, as a hearing had been provided,
id. at 430 n.1, during which the plaintiff was presumably given an opportunity to justify his posses-
sion of the items.
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vaguely required that prisoners be given "adequate procedural safe-
guards" and an "opportunity to justify the possession." 80 Cases not di-
rectly discussing the property interest in internal prison contraband pro-
vide some insight into other courts' visions of the minimum requirements
of due process.81
It is both difficult and impractical to establish in the abstract what pro-
cess is due in the various cases that may arise in the prison setting.82 The
Supreme Court, however, has stated the general factors to be considered
in deciding what process is due in property cases: (i) the private interest
that will be affected by the official action; (ii) the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (iii)
the government's interest, including the function involved as well as the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional requirement would
entail. 83
The importance of a prisoner's interest will depend in large part on the
value of the items. It will also vary according to whether the confiscation
is temporary or permanent: Though due process protections attach even to
temporary confiscations, 84 more procedural protections would be required
for permanent confiscations since the prisoner loses not only his possessory
interest, but his ownership interest as well.85 The difference in accuracy
that additional protections will make depends in large part on the nature
of the property. With some items, such as weapons or marijuana, deter-
80. Sell, 548 F.2d at 759.
81. The Ninth Circuit held the following safeguards adequate for the seizure of contraband in
which no property interest was recognized: The seizure was entered into a formal log; notice was
provided to the prisoner within twenty-four hours of confiscation; and there was a right of appeal to a
committee whose members did not make the initial decision to confiscate. Sherman v. MacDougall,
656 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1981). In United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 151
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd sub norn. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds sub norn. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), the court said that prisoners must be given a
receipt and accorded "certain [other] minimal procedures," including notice of right to respond in a
reasonable and timely manner, the opportunity to meet and answer controverted evidence, and a deci-
sion with reasons, however brief.
82. The primary aim of this Note is not to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of various
kinds of procedural protections, nor even to suggest which ones at a minimum must be provided. The
primary aim is to show that a property interest does exist in prison contraband, and that this interest
may not be abridged without clear statutory authority and some procedural protections. The present
section is included to point out what considerations are pertinent when courts review the protections
which are provided, and that the full panoply of protections need not be offered in every case.
83. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
84. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84-86 (1972) ("[I]t is now well settled that a temporary,
nonfinal deprivation of property is nonetheless a 'deprivation' in the terms of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment .... [T]he length and consequent severity of a deprivation may, however, be another factor to
weigh in determining the appropriate form of hearing . . ").
85. The Note does not dispute the principle that permanent confiscations are constitutional if no
property interest is implicated as, for example, where the items are contraband per se or where there
is adequate statutory authority for permanent confiscation, see statutes cited supra note 66.
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mining what they are and that their possession is illegal is quite simple.
With other items, however, such as literature that the warden deems por-
nographic or otherwise dangerous to prison discipline and security, the
determination may be more difficult. Protections required will also depend
on whether the prisoner, in his initial complaint, admits that the property
was contraband. 6 The government's interest will vary according to the
nature of the property, the urgency of the need to remove it from the
prisoner's possession, the difficulties presented in storing it, and the proce-
dural protections that would be required to determine whether or not it is
in fact contraband.
CONCLUSION
Rather than continuing to dismiss prison contraband cases, courts
should address the basic due process questions presented. When courts do
address these questions, they should avoid the error of confusing internal
with external prison contraband and of looking to whether the state has
recognized a property interest in prison contraband as such. Instead,
courts should note that the property interest held outside the prison is
retained even after the property is brought into the prison. Finally, courts
must recognize the requirements of due process and demand that a pris-
oner's property not be permanently confiscated absent clear statutory au-
thority and unless adequate procedural protections have been provided.
-Michael 0. Hill
86. In United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956), the Supreme Court signifi-
cantly limited the extent of an applicant's hearing right by allowing the FCC to deny a hearing to
broadcast license applicants who were plainly and automatically disqualified by its regulations. Where
the regulations were reasonable and the plaintiff's application failed on its face to meet the regula-
tions' requirements, the Court permitted the FCC to preclude plaintiff from having a full hearing.
The Court's holding should not be taken to mean that the plaintiff was not entitled to at least some
procedural protections (e.g., a review of the application to discern whether or not it did in fact plainly
fall outside of the regulations' ambit). As stated in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974),
the plaintiff was entitled to "some kind of hearing." A "hearing," however is a "verbal coat of too
many colors," Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1270 (1975) (quoting
United States v. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 39 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)), and
in some cases even procedures as sketchy as those given in Storer might meet the test, id. at 1272-73.
